Football economics have gone insane in past years. Normal fans are amazed. But the numbers no longer shock insiders.
Football clubs are now surpassing the billion mark in annual revenue. The English league is breaking transfer record after transfer record. Private equity groups, credit funds and sovereign wealth managers are circling the game as though it were infrastructure.
What looks like reckless spending from the stands is, in fact, the by-product of stable revenue growth, new financial rules, and the rise of private credit.
The truth is that the beautiful game has been industrialised. The cash is real, the risks are measurable, and the game has been reshaped into something investors can model.
Why money keeps pouring in
Back in the day, football clubs used to be loss-making hobbies for wealthy owners. Today they’ve essentially turned into global media and real estate businesses with reliable cash flows.
Deloitte’s 2025 Football Money League report shows average revenue of €560 million per club in the top 20, with 44% from commercial income, 38% from broadcast, and 18% from matchday.
Matchday income alone exceeded €2.1 billion, the highest on record. Real Madrid doubled matchday revenue to €248 million after opening its renovated Bernabéu, fuelled by new VIP seats and personal seat licences.
Half the clubs in Deloitte’s ranking are redeveloping stadiums. The logic is that a modern arena generates income year-round from concerts, hospitality and retail.
Broadcasting remains the bedrock for many teams, but the biggest clubs now depend more on commercial deals.
Sponsorships, retail, and brand licensing allow clubs like Tottenham and Manchester United to remain in the top 10 even when they miss the Champions League.
This is the structural gap between the “superclubs” and everyone else. For clubs ranked 11–20, 47% of income still comes from broadcasting. For the top 10, commercial dominates at 48%. The business models have diverged.
Private capital is the name of the (beautiful) game
According to Pitchbook, Private credit has become the main entry point for investors. Apollo lent Nottingham Forest €93 million in 2025, secured against its stadium, at an interest rate of 8.75% for three years. The private equity firm is now considering launching a $5 billion sports investment vehicle.
Oaktree provided financing to Inter Milan and ended up owning the club when the debt defaulted. Ares financed Chelsea and Lyon. Carlyle backed Atalanta.
These deals offer equity-like returns with downside protection. Loans are secured against stadiums or media rights, collateral that retains value regardless of whether the team qualifies for Europe. With reliable revenue flows and regulatory cost controls, clubs are attractive borrowers.
Equity investments are now structured as minority stakes. Jim Ratcliffe’s €5.8 billion valuation for Manchester United came through the purchase of 29% of the club. Barcelona sold 25% of future TV rights to Sixth Street.
Full control deals are rare, partly because owners want to retain influence, partly because regulators have sharpened their focus.
At the distressed end of the spectrum, lower-league takeovers still occur. Everton, Sampdoria and Saint-Étienne changed hands recently. Wrexham is the textbook case, which was bought for around €2.1 million in 2020. Its rumoured valuation has now surpassed €400 million thanks to promotion, celebrity ownership and global media exposure.
What the rules really mean
The wild west of football finance is gone. UEFA’s Financial Sustainability Regulations bite fully in the 2025/26 season.
Clubs must keep squad costs to 70% of revenue, limit losses to €60 million over three years, and pay bills within 90 days.
And the enforcement is serious. Chelsea received a record €31.1 million fine for historical breaches, although it was just a drop in the ocean for a club that wealthy.
Crystal Palace was barred from the Europa League because of an ownership conflict with Lyon, costing it around £20 million in lost revenue.
These rules are significant because they turn football cash flows into something predictable. Wage-to-revenue ratios are capped. Losses are capped. Payables are capped.
For lenders, this is covenant language they understand. While for investors, it means they can price risk with more confidence.
The regulations also entrench the advantages of the richest clubs. Teams already earning close to €1 billion annually can afford top squads without breaching the caps. At the same time, smaller teams cannot spend beyond their revenue base.
Why England dominates
The Premier League is in a different league financially. Deloitte puts combined revenue for its 20 clubs at £6.6 billion in 2023/24, rising to £6.9 billion this season.
International broadcasting deals in Asia, the Middle East and North Africa are driving the growth. From 2026/27, the league will take media production in-house for international rights, further professionalising its content business.
That scale explains the transfer spending. The 2024/2025 champions, Liverpool, spent more than £200 million on two players in summer 2025. The total Premier League outlay exceeded the other four big leagues combined.
Contrast that with France. Domestic broadcast rights collapsed after the DAZN deal was terminated. Ligue 1 revenue has fallen to less than half its peak. The league is launching its own streaming service, Ligue 1+, for the 2025/26 season.
This is a test of whether a direct-to-consumer model can replace the old broadcaster-led system. For now, it means French clubs face a deep income trough, precisely when financial rules are getting stricter.
Meanwhile, Germany is limited by its 50+1 ownership rule, which caps outside investor control. Twice, the league has rejected proposals for private equity investment.
Spain is more open but more conservative, with broadcast rights and tax regimes shaping the financial landscape.
Why the spending isn’t as crazy as it looks
To outsiders, nine-figure transfer fees appear reckless. But they sit on top of revenue streams that are bigger and more reliable than ever.
When Real Madrid clears €1 billion and the Premier League as a whole approaches €7 billion, paying €125 million for a striker becomes a matter of cash-flow allocation.
Stadium economics reinforce this. Tottenham lifted average matchday spend per fan from £1.50 to £15 after moving into its new ground. Everton expects the same from its new stadium.
These venues behave like algorithms: they convert global attention into local spend, whether through football, concerts, or sponsorship activation.
Investors have learned that the pitch is no longer the whole story. Football clubs are platforms that monetise attention through buildings and content.
Publicly listed clubs such as Manchester United, Juventus and Borussia Dortmund may attract attention but are rarely compelling financial investments. For retail investors, they are nothing more than speculative plays on prestige brands.
Private credit is the natural fit, turning those cash flows into secured, predictable returns. Minority equity adds brand exposure, while distressed control deals offer asymmetric upside.
The regulatory framework acts as the rulebook, defining the boundaries for all players in the system.
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